Understanding the Bosnian Election Results
Yesterday, Bosnia and Herzegovina held its general election, choosing representatives across the country’s many, many layers of government. Bosnian voters were tasked with considerably more than just picking a national parliament. They also elected the country’s three-member presidency, representatives to the entity-level parliaments, and members of cantonal assemblies. Bosnia’s labyrinthine electoral system is perhaps one of its best-known features. Understanding how it works is, unfortunately, essential to understanding both yesterday’s result and the political crisis that has defined the country’s politics over the past few years. More on that later.
Given an increasingly precarious international environment, more direct malign Russian influence in the country, mounting economic problems and secessionist threats, the election was probably the most important election Bosnia’s citizens have faced since the country's independence. Paradoxically, it also seems to have been the election that voters and politicians cared about the least.
While the exact implications of the results are not yet clear, I think we can draw two broad conclusions from yesterday’s election:
- More than any previous election, the results show how profoundly political apathy has come to dominate Bosnia’s politics.
- The election result represents an abject failure of the EU’s policies toward the Western Balkans over the past five years.
Let’s go through each in turn.
Political Apathy
The first striking thing about yesterday’s election is just how many people did not participate. Turnout was 42.02%, a historic low. Among Bosnians living abroad, the so-called diaspora voters such as myself, fewer than 50,000 registered for postal ballots, a decrease of almost 20,000 voters. An election with potentially enormous consequences attracted remarkably little participation.
In the political science literature, there are several explanations for this kind of political disengagement. One is corruption and the distrust it generates. When politicians repeatedly disappoint voters by simply being crooked, voters can lose confidence in the entire political process. That explanation certainly has some purchase in Bosnia, given a long history of frequent scandals involving high-ranking politicians from virtually every single political party.
Another explanation of political apathy is the absence of appealing political alternatives. If you are an American who dislikes both Democrats and Republicans, you may conclude that neither choice is worth the effort of voting at all.
Fewer voters at the ballot box
Turnout in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006–2026
2006–2022: IFES ElectionGuide, national House of Representatives turnout. 2026 figure based on preliminary results.
This explanation also has merit in Bosnia, but the lack of meaningful alternatives takes a different form, as there is certainly no shortage of choices in the voting booth. Political fragmentation is a defining feature of the country’s politics: A veritable profusion of small parties, breakaway parties, local lists, parties built around individual politicians, and independent candidates compete across its many layers of government. In 2022 alone, election officials initially certified 90 parties and 17 independent candidates across the different elections. Bosnian voters have plenty of names to choose from.
My argument is that Bosnia’s political apathy stems less from a shortage of electoral alternatives than from the institutional arrangements that determine what happens after people vote. In Bosnia, understanding political apathy requires looking beyond the ballot and into the constitution itself.
To make a (very) long story short, Bosnia’s constitution, contained in Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, makes ethnic power-sharing a central principle. In practice, this creates a system riddled with veto points, highly prone to deadlock. Consider the House of Peoples, one of the two chambers of the national parliament, whose approval is required for the passing of legislation. It contains five Bosniak, five Bosnian Croat and five Bosnian Serb delegates. Importantly, for the House of Peoples to conduct business, at least three delegates from each ethnic group must be present. If three delegates from one group refuse to attend, the chamber loses its quorum. A mere three representatives can therefore prevent the chamber from acting and bring state lawmaking to a halt simply by staying away.
The Dayton System in Practice.
A not-so-hypothetical example of how bad it can get
House of Representatives
All representatives vote yes
House of Peoples
All 12 present support the bill
At least three delegates from each constituent people must be present. Three absences in one group leave only two. Even unanimous support among everyone present cannot substitute for a quorum.
Beyond making the legislative process and government formation resemble something out of Kafka’s The Trial, these arrangements severely restrict the space for change. Even if 90% of voters supported a new political movement, a party backed by the remaining 10% could still cause legislative paralysis if it controlled three critical seats in the House of Peoples, allowing it to deny the chamber a quorum.
This is by no means a contrived hypothetical. After the 2018 election, the Bosnian Croat HDZ made the formation of a new Federation government conditional on changes to the election law. Its coalition had won just 14.35% of the vote for the Federation’s House of Representatives, yet held a critical majority in the Bosnian Croat caucus of the Federation’s House of Peoples, allowing it to hold government formation hostage. The blockade lasted the entire electoral term: voters went back to the polls in 2022 without the previous election ever having produced a new government.
This is a system in which a party can be rejected by the overwhelming majority of voters nationwide and still remain extraordinarily difficult to govern without. After nearly thirty years of such a quagmire, many voters have gradually come to recognize the limits of what their ballots can change. Their decision to stay home is hardly surprising: when even a decisive victory offers little prospect of change, it becomes difficult to muster much enthusiasm for another election.
The politicians also know this – which is why they hardly bother campaigning. In most other democratic countries, any politician would love to get time on air on national television to be able to present their policy programme. In Bosnia, only one out of four presidential candidates competing for the Bosniak member of presidency bothered to show up for a televised debate on the national broadcasting channel.
For the Bosnian-Croat seat, not a single one showed up.
None of this means that voting in Bosnia is actually pointless. Elections still shape who governs at lower levels, including the cantons, which wield considerable power in the country’s decentralized system. A stronger electoral mandate can also strengthen a party’s hand in negotiations with its rivals and lend weight to its appeals for support from external actors, such as the European Union. Speak of the devil.
The Failure of the EU
Aside from widespread political apathy, another key takeaway from yesterday’s election is that Bosnian voters resoundingly rejected the incumbent government – the so-called “Trojka” coalition, consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), People and Justice (NiP), and Our Party (NS) - while the two main opposition parties (SDA and SBIH) gained ground. But the lack of success extends beyond the parties themselves. EU officials invested considerable political credibility in this coalition, presenting it as the beginning of a more constructive era in Bosnian politics. Their failure is therefore also a verdict on the assumptions behind their approach.
After the previous general election in 2022, the promise was that a new coalition would finally move Bosnia forward. European officials such as Ursula von der Leyen, Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi and foreign embassies, chiefly the US embassy, threw their political weight behind the Trojka as a more constructive alternative to the long-dominant Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Out went SDA. In came the Trojka, with international support and the promise that a greater willingness to compromise would finally break the deadlock. Alongside the Trojka remained two familiar faces: the Bosnian Croat HDZ and Milorad Dodik’s Bosnian Serb SNSD. The renewal, it seemed, only required replacing one part of the previous arrangement.
Opposition parties gain at the expense of the ruling coalition
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina · selected parties · provisional 2026 snapshot
Government and opposition labels refer to the outgoing term, as discussed in the article. NS = Naša stranka (Our Party); NIP = People and Justice. The NIP row combines the separate NiP and SD BiH lists in 2022 (9.26%) and compares them with their joint 2026 list (6.92%). Vote shares based on preliminary results. pp = percentage points.
International actors did more than applaud from the sidelines. In October 2022, High Representative Christian Schmidt changed the rules governing the Federation’s institutions hours after voters had cast their ballots. In April 2023, he intervened again, suspending the constitution to allow the new government to be formed without the vice-president’s consent (who came from an opposition party).
The European Commission enthusiastically embraced the promise of the new political arrangement. In March 2024, Ursula von der Leyen even declared: “More progress has been achieved in just over a year than in a whole decade”. Bosnia, we were being told, had finally turned a corner.
So did the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat camps truly change? No. Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik kept threatening secession and stoking ethnic tensions, including by denying the Srebrenica genocide, while his party continued obstructing reform. When the Trojka tried to remove SNSD ministers from government, the Bosnian Croat HDZ helped keep them in office.
This, in my view, is the chief reason the incumbent government lost support. The Trojka hitched its wagon to the EU’s Bosnia project, promising that the politicians who had spent years derailing reform attempts could now be persuaded to cooperate. Bosnian voters were largely persuaded by their enthusiasm and by EU’s promises of true change. In exchange, they got another four years of deadlock and another four years of broken promises.
To anybody with even a cursory understanding of Bosnian politics, voters’ scathing indictment of the EU’s approach to Bosnia should come as no surprise. The European Union, chiefly the EU Commission, has been deeply unprincipled in its approach. It professes commitment to democratic reforms in Bosnia and underscores these reforms as necessary for future EU membership. Yet it consistently fails to put its political weight behind changing what undermines any attempt at reform in the first place: an unjust constitution that entrenches ethnic segregation at the expense of equal political rights, and the HDZ and SNSD leaderships that defend and benefit from this system. So much for "democracy being the foundation of our prosperity and security".
Nobody can say for sure what happens next. Bosnian politics is notoriously mercurial. Negotiations at the state level may fail to produce a government at all, while meaningful change could still emerge at lower levels, including the vital Sarajevo Canton. But whatever coalitions eventually take shape, it will take a long time to repair the damage that has been done, not just to voters’ trust in Bosnian democracy, but also the credibility of the European Union as a whole.